Abstract. We prove the unconditional security of a quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol on a noisy channel against the most general attack allowed by quantum physics. We use the fact that in a previous paper we have reduced the proof of the unconditionally security of this QKD protocol to a proof that a corresponding Quantum String Oblivious Transfer (String-QOT) protocol would be unconditionally secure against Bob if implemented on top of an unconditionally secure bit commitment scheme. We prove a lemma that extends a security proof given by Yao for a (one bit) QOT protocol to this String-QOT protocol. This result and the reduction mentioned above implies the unconditional security of our QKD protocol despite our previous proof that unconditionally secure bit commitment schemes are impossible.
Introduction and Brief History
One of the most popular application of quantum physics to cryptography is quantum key distribution (QKD). In an ideal QKD, Alice and Bob who share no secret information initially, share a secret string s at the end. An eavesdropper, typically called Eve, should learn nothing about the secret string s, except perhaps for its length.
In this paper, we prove the security of a QKD protocol against the most general attack allowed by quantum physics. This QKD protocol works with a noisy quantum channel, an imperfect measuring apparatus, but requires a perfect source and a faithful classical channel. A channel is faithful if no one can modified a message sent in the channel without being detected. The need for a faithful classical channel is not a problem because a secret string s 0 initially shared between Alice and Bob can be used to simulate a faithful classical channel by use of an unconditionally secure classical authentication scheme [26] . We assume a perfect source to avoid the technical difficulty associated with many photons per pulse.
Our preliminary version of the protocol uses a random linear code for error correction. Random linear codes are very difficult to decode. However, this problem can be solved and a version of the protocol using an efficient error correcting code and with no requirement for a perfect source will be considered in the journal version of this paper.
In addition to QKD, other applications of quantum physics to cryptography have been proposed. The most popular are quantum bit commitment (QBC) and quantum oblivious transfer (QOT). We briefly review these protocols since we shall refer to them in our results. In the bit commitment task from Alice to Bob, Alice commits a bit b. Later, if Bob asks Alice to unveil the commitment, he receives the bit b. The main point is that Alice cannot change the value of b and Bob learns nothing about b unless Alice unveils it. In the oblivious transfer task from Alice to Bob, Alice enters a bit b, Bob receives a perfectly random bit c and he learns the value of b if and only if c = 0. Alice learns nothing about c.
The first quantum bit commitment protocol ever proposed is due to Bennett and Brassard [2] . The authors themselves knew at the time that this protocol is insecure. Other quantum bit commitment protocol have been proposed, but none of them could be proven unconditionally secure. In fact, it has been shown recently that unconditional security for quantum bit commitment is impossible [18, 19, 20] . A proof of computational security for a quantum bit commitment protocol is still possible, but none is currently available. The absence of a provably secure bit commitment is unfortunate because all the known quantum oblivious transfers are built on top of bit commitment, that is, they use quantum bit commitment as a sub-protocol.
The first quantum oblivious transfer protocol which would be secure if implemented on top of a secure bit commitment protocol has been proposed by Crépeau [12] . Its security against most but not all reasonable attacks allowed by the current technology has been shown in [5] . The first proof that considered the most general attack allowed by quantum physics, including the so called coherent measurements on many photons at a time, has been obtained by Yao [27] . Yao's proof is an important step and provides useful techniques, but it provides no security because, as for all the previous proofs [5, 21] , it requires a secure bit commitment and none has yet been proven secure. Now, we are back to QKD. The security of a QKD protocol against most but not all reasonable attacks allowed by the current technology has been established in [3, 4] . In [17] , we have reduced the unconditional security of any QKD protocol of a certain kind to a proof that a corresponding String-QOT protocol would be unconditionally secure if implemented on top of an unconditionally secure bit commitment scheme. A QKD protocol of the appropriate type is associated with a corresponding String-QOT protocol. The standard QOT protocol in Yao's proof turns out to be associated with a QKD protocol of the appropriate type. Therefore, the unconditional security of this QKD protocol is obtained from the above reduction. However, there are two problems with this protocol. First, the QOT protocol in Yao's proof is a standard one bit QOT, therefore only one secret bit is returned in the QKD version. One can repeat the protocol n times to obtain a secret string of length n, but an initial secret key s 0 is required to simulate a faithful classical channel and, therefore, each execution of the protocol uses more secret bits than it returns back! Second, the QOT protocol in Yao's proof, and thus the corresponding QKD protocol, requires a noiseless quantum channel and a perfect source.
In this paper, to pursue the original idea of [17] , we extend Yao's proof to a String-QOT protocol associated via the above reduction with a "strong" QKD protocol. Therefore, we have the unconditional security of this QKD protocol. This QKD protocol returns a secret string s that is longer than the required initial string s 0 . Also, it works in a noisy quantum channel. Note that our proof for this QKD protocol considers any kind of errors in Bob's apparatus because we give full control over both the channel and the apparatus to a dishonest Bob in String-QOT.
It is shown in [6] that the security of any OT protocol implies the security of a String-OT protocol. In particular, the security of the QOT protocol in Yao's proof implies the security of a String-QOT protocol. However, the security of the resulting String-QOT protocol does not imply the security of a QKD protocol via the above reduction because it is not of the required type. Yao did not mention the possibility of generalizing his proof to the String-QOT case. It should be said that Yao was not aware of the above reduction (or did not believe it) at the time he wrote his paper [27] . Yao has announced in [27] that in the journal version of his paper the QOT protocol will work on a noisy channel but our String-QOT protocol has been designed to work on a noisy channel without much additional effort.
Related results
The main problem that one must address in the design of a QKD protocol is that Alice and Bob must exchange quantum systems, let say photons, and there is no way to distinguish interaction of these photons with the environment and interaction of these photons with Eve's measuring apparatus. Therefore, Eve can always succeed to entangle her measuring apparatus with the exchanged photons without being detected. Later, if these photons are used to define the shared key, Eve can obtain information about this key. However, using privacy amplification techniques, one can make this information arbitrarily small. For example, in the QKD protocol considered in this paper, a classical string w ′ ∈ {0, 1} N is stored in N photons traveling from Alice to Bob. Because Eve can obtain information about w ′ , privacy amplification must be used to distill from w ′ a shorter but secret string b = h(w ′ ). Privacy amplification is an essential part of any QKD protocol. Privacy amplification in the QOT protocol of Yao's proof corresponds to the fact that the secret bit is the exclusive or of all the bits of w ′ . Much after the BB84 protocol of [2] have been proposed, Ekert suggested a scheme in which EPR pairs are created and the photons in each pair are split between Alice and Bob [15] . In this EPR scheme, no information is stored in the photons before they are sent, therefore one would hope that no information can be extracted by Eve. However, Eve can still entangle her apparatus with the photons and it has been shown that the kind of attacks that could work against the BB84 scheme correspond to attacks that would work against this EPR scheme [8] . This result highly suggested that EPR pairs might not be useful for quantum cryptography.
However, recently Deutsch, Ekert and al. proposed another EPR-based protocol with a new element, an entanglement purification procedure also called in this context a quantum privacy amplification procedure [14] . Entanglement purification [9] allows Alice and Bob to generate, from any supply of pairs of photons with non-zero entanglement, a smaller set of maximally entangled EPR pairs whose entanglement with any outside system, including Eve's apparatus, is arbitrarily low. Deutsch, Ekert and al. reasonably argue that their protocol is unconditionally secure against the most general attack allowed by quantum physics. An interesting point is that privacy amplification is done at the quantum level, and one can hope that this kind of privacy amplification procedure is more efficient. On the other hand, working prototypes for protocol that use simple quantum coding schemes already exist [24, 25, 22, 23, 16] , whereas the technology required for this EPR-based protocol is not yet available.
Let us emphasis that in a security proof for a QKD or a String-QOT protocol one must consider carefully the criteria to reject or accept an execution of the protocol. This criteria always exists for a given lower bound on the length of the shared key or string. In the case of our String-QOT protocol, Alice must detect less than δn errors. One must show that this criteria implies that the cheater cannot succeed. This analysis is difficult in the case of the most general attack allowed by quantum physics and to our knowledge only Yao's paper [27] deals rigorously with this issue.
The purpose of quantum cryptography is not only to prove the security of protocols. We also want to design more efficient protocols and see how efficient are these protocols in theory and in practice. Biham and Mor have obtained the maximal theoretical efficiency of the QKD protocol of [1] against a restricted but still reasonable type of attacks [10] . Furthermore, it is reasonable to believe that we could eventually prove that the security parameter required against this restricted type of attack is not too far from the security parameter required against the most general attack.
Some algebra
Typically, a quantum protocol involves many systems and each system is associated with its own Hilbert space H also called a state space. For example, the polarization of a photon is associated with a two dimensional Hilbert space. The inner product of H evaluated on (|φ , |ψ ) ∈ H 2 is denoted φ|ψ . For every vector |φ ∈ H, let |φ † : H → C be be the linear functional on H which, when evaluated on any vector |ψ ∈ H, simply returns the inner product φ|ψ . For obvious reason, |φ † is more conveniently denoted φ|. In terms of matrices, one represents a vector |ψ ∈ H as a column matrix. The operation " †" on a matrix is simply the transpose conjugate, therefore ψ| is represented by a row matrix. The space of linear functionals on H is denoted H † . It is called the dual of H. The inner product of H is also an operation on the cartesian product H † × H. This operation can be generalized to any cartesian product of the form G 1 × . . . × G n where each space G i occurs only once and is either a state space H or its dual. We simply let any functional φ| ∈ G i = H † operate on the state |ψ ∈ G j = H to its right, if one exists. Every thing else should not be simplified. For example, consider
The tensor product G 1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ G n can be interpreted as the span of the product G 1 × . . . × G n . If |φ 1 |φ 2 and |ψ 1 |ψ 2 belong to H 1 × H 2 then the sum |φ 1 |φ 2 + |ψ 1 |ψ 2 belongs to H 1 ⊗ H 2 . A formal definition of this tensor product is usually not so enlightening, so none is given here, but the basic idea is simply to extend by linearity the operations that are defined above. Two objects that cannot be distinguished via these operations (neither as operators or as operands) are considered to be identical. One should notice the following rules:
-For every H, every pair of objects in H ∪ H † does not commute, but everything else commute.
-Because φ|ψ = ψ|φ * , where " * "denotes the complex conjugate, we have
The trace of an operator M ∈ H ⊗ H † , i.e., from H into H, is defined by Tr(M ) = α ψ α |M |ψ α where {|ψ α } is any orthonormal basis of H. This definition is independent of the basis {|ψ α }.
The set {0, 1} with the operation ⊕ and the ordinary product is a finite field denoted GF(2). The set GF (2) n with the operation ⊕ is a vector space over the field GF(2). Let f be a m × n boolean matrix and z a boolean string of length n, the product f z is the ordinary matrix operation with the sum modulo 2 where z is seen as a boolean column matrix.
Quantum preliminaries
The state of a system, also called a pure state, is represented by a vector |ψ of norm 1 in the associated Hilbert space H. The state space of a system made of n subsystems with state spaces H 1 , . . . , H n is the tensor product H 1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ H n . A completely refined measurement on H is a set of outcomes v where every outcome v is associated with a vector |φ v ∈ H, but here the norm could be anything between 0 and 1. The probability of v given the initial state |ψ ∈ H is simply | φ v |ψ | 2 = φ v |ψ ψ|φ v . The only requirement on the states |φ v is that v |φ v φ v | = I, the identity operator. This is equivalent to say that, for every initial state |ψ , the sum of the probabilities over the outcomes v is 1. The final quantum state left after the measurement is some state |v which should not be confused with the vector |φ v . The operation associated with v is given by M v = |v φ v |. One may check that the probability of v given the initial state |ψ is M v |ψ 2 , the square of the norm of M v |ψ . The final state |v can be anything because just at the end of the measurement one is free to store the residual quantum information into the final state |v of his choice. If Ω = {|φ v } is a basis of H, a measurement in the basis Ω is simply the measurement that associate v to |φ v . Such a measurement is called an orthogonal measurement. Now, let us generalize to incomplete measurement the above definition. The most general measurement on H is a set of outcome k where every outcome k is associated with an operator M k on H. The difference with a complete measurement is that M k is in general a sum
The image of M k can be any sufficiently large state space H k , because just at the end of the measurement one is free to store the residual quantum information into the system of his choice. For example, the quantum information can be send from the state space of a photon into the state space of an atom. The probability of k given an initial state |ψ is M k |ψ 2 . Every measurement M on a state space H which returns an outcome k can be refined by executing another measurement 
If a quantum preparation contains a pure state |ψ α with probability p α , then one may conveniently represent this preparation by the operator ρ = α p α |ψ α ψ α |. The idea is that the probability of v given the preparation represented by ρ is simply φ v |ρ|φ v . This works even if the initial states |ψ α are not orthogonal. Note the important fact that two distinct preparations may correspond to a same density operator. Even for an incomplete measurement on a given preparation, one may use the density operator ρ of this preparation to compute the probability of an outcome k. We have that Pr(K = k|ρ) = Tr(Π k ρ), where
This trace is linear on Π k and linear on ρ. Therefore, it is often advantageous to work with Π k and ρ rather than with M k and |ψ α . The matrix representation of the operator ρ in the basis {|ψ α } is defined by
In accordance with the BB84 coding scheme, the states |0 + , |0 × , |1 + and |1 × corresponds to one photon polarized at 0
• , 45
• , 90
• and −45
• degrees respectively. Note that + and × corresponds to the bases {|0 + , |1 + } and {|0 × , |1 × } respectively. For every θ ∈ {+, ×} n and every w ∈ {0, 1} n , |ψ w,θ denotes the product state |w 1 θ1 . . . |w n θn . For any set of positions E = {γ 1 , . . . , γ N }, let w[E] be the string given by w[E] i = w γi , 1 ≤ i ≤ N , and let |ψ w,θ [E] be the product state |w i1 θi 1 . . . |w iN θi N for the photons with position in E.
The String-QOT protocol and its security
The QOT protocol considered by Yao in [27] is a variant of the QOT protocol which has been first proposed by Crépeau [11, 12] and improved later in [5, 13] . We consider the natural generalization of this single bit QOT protocol to a string QOT. In this String-QOT protocol, n is the number of photons sent in the protocol, b is the string sent by Alice, m is the length of b, r is the number of redundant bits needed for error correction, and N = ⌊.24n⌋ is the length of the string shared between Alice and Bob before privacy amplification.
STRING-QOT(b)
1. Alice picks a random uniformly chosen (r + m) × N boolean matrix f where the r first rows define a matrix g used for error correction and the m following rows define a matrix h used for privacy amplification (see step 7). 2. Bob picks a random uniformly chosenθ =θ 1 . . .θ n ∈ {+, ×} n and makes a quantum commit of allθ i to Alice. 3. Alice picks a random uniformly chosen w ∈ {0, 1} n , a random uniformly chosen θ ∈ {+, ×} n , and sends to Bob n photons in the state |ψ w,θ . 4. Bob measures every photon i in basisθ i , record the resultsŵ i and makes a quantum commit of all n bitsŵ i to Alice. 5. Alice picks a random uniformly chosen subset R ⊆ {1, . . . , n} and tests the commitment made by Bob at positions i ∈ R. If more than δn positions i ∈ R reveal θ i =θ i and w i =ŵ i , then Alice stops the protocol; otherwise, the test result is accepted. 6. Alice announces the string θ. Let T 0 be the set of all i with θ i =θ i , and let T 1 be the set of all i with θ i =θ i . Bob chooses a set E 0 ⊆ T 0 − R, a set E 1 ⊆ T 1 − R, where |E 0 | = |E 1 | = N , and announces {E 0 , E 1 } in random order to Alice. 7. Alice chooses at random a set E c ∈ {E 0 , E 1 }. For error correction, she announces the matrix g and the string s Yao's QOT protocol is exactly as above, except that r = 0, m = 1 and the 1 × N matrix f is (1, 1, . . . , 1), that is, there is no error correction and there is only one secret bit t = t 1 which is the exclusive or of all the bits in w[E c ]. The QKD version is identical to the String-QOT protocol, except that Bob announces E 0 to Alice rather than {E 0 , E 1 } and Alice always chooses c = 0. In this paper, we shall only consider attacks that correspond to attacks that may be executed by Eve in the QKD version. Clearly, Eve has no control over the set E 0 (and E 1 ), so we shall assume that Bob constructs E 0 and E 1 as specified in the protocol. The case in which there is no restriction on E 0 and E 1 is not more difficult, but we don't need it to obtain the security of the QKD protocol.
In most cases, a random variable is represented by an upper case letter, whereas the value taken by such a variable is represented by a lower case letter, for instance, the bit c is the value taken by a random variable C. However, if the value itself is represented by an upper case letter which is typically the case when the value is a set, we use bold face typesetting for the random variable to distinguish it from its value.
Let V be Bob's view at the end of the protocol. Let Pass be the binary random variable that takes the value 1 if and only if the test result is accepted. To obtain the security of the above protocol against Bob, for any attack where E 0 and E 1 are honestly chosen, we show that there exists a factor of security ξ > 0 such that, for any initial distribution of probability on B, I(B; V |Pass = 1 ∧ C = 1) × Pr(Pass = 1) ≤ 2 −ξn .
Bob's view
Let us assume that the possible values (b, w, θ) of (B, W, Θ) are stored in orthonormal states |b, w, θ C . The entire view of Bob can be seen as the outcome of a measurement executed on |b, w, θ C |ψ w,θ . This measurement is not executed by Bob alone. For instance, the announcement of θ by Alice is part of this measurement. Furthermore, we shall generously assume that at the end Alice announces w[Ē c ] to Bob. Let us analyze the operation M v associated with a view v. We consider a fixed value ofθ. At step 4 the measurement operates only on |ψ w,θ and returnsŵ: we consider the classical computation ofŵ as part of the measurement executed by a dishonest Bob. The corresponding operation on the photons is denoted Mŵ. At step 5, R is chosen by Alice and announced to Bob. This has no physical effect on the initial state, but still the corresponding operation is M R = 2 −n I. Next, Alice announces the result of the test. This corresponds to a projection P pass on the classical part of the state space. Note that this projection is defined in view ofŵ which is obtained from a measurement on the photons. At step 6 Alice announces θ. The corresponding operation is the projection P θ = |θ θ| C . The announcement of E c corresponds to the operation M c = 2 −1 I. Similarly, let P s and P a be respectively the projection that corresponds to the announcement of s and a. We have that P s projects on the span of the states |w[E c ] C such that S = s and P a projects on the span of the states |b, Note that Bob has no advantage in measuring the photons at step 6 (because he creates E 0 and E 1 honestly). So the operation Mŵ on the photons at step 5 remains the same at step 6. At step 7, Alice announces the information for privacy amplification and error correction, but this is under Alice's control and operates only on the classical part of the initial state. Certainly, at step 8, Bob is free to execute on the residual state of the photons the complete measurement of his choice. The final operation on the initial state |b, w, θ C |ψ w,θ is of the form M v = 2 −(n+1) P C |v φ v | where |v φ v | operates on |ψ w,θ and P C is the projection P w P a P s P θ on the classical part |b, w, θ C . The projection P pass does not appear because it is implicit in P w P θ .
The small distance property
In this section, we want to find a property on M v that can be proven using the fact that Bob must pass the test. Of course, we also want a property that implies that Bob has no information when c = 1. We recall that no more than δn positions i for which θ i =θ i and w i =ŵ i are tolerated in the test.
Let us consider an example in which Bob stores some photons and measures them only after that the bases have been announced by Alice. Let ǫ = 8δ. Bob cannot store much more than ǫn photons, because otherwise he will not pass the test: half of the photons are used for the test, half of these tested photons will be in the correct basis and half of these will create an error. Consider the case where Bob stores exactly ǫn photons. Let F be the set of stored photons andF the set of non stored photons. To pass the test, Bob measures the non stored photons using the committed string of basesθ [F ] . In particular, λ α = 0 implies d(α,ŵ) ≤ ǫn. Of course, Bob could choose the photons that he stores at random and in view of the previous outcomes. In this case, we cannot expect that, for some fixed set F , λ α = 0 implies α[F ] =ŵ [F ] . However, it is still reasonable to expect that λ α = 0 implies d(α,ŵ) ≤ ǫn. That is, the state |φ v must be in the span of the states |ψ α,θ with d(α,ŵ) ≤ ǫn. This is exactly the property that is called the low weight property by Yao [27] . In Yao's proof, ǫ = 1/40. The test of the QOT protocol in Yao's proof tolerates no error at all: δ = 0. However, Yao's proof works exactly in the same way even when δ > 0. In section 10 we shall briefly sketch an alternative proof.
Let us formulate the low-weight property in terms of M v and the set E c . We consider E c because it contains the relevant positions. Let E ⊆ {1, . . . , n} be any set of positions and ǫ be some small positive number.
is the usual Hamming distance. We denote L 1 [E, ǫn] the span of the states |ψ α,θ where d E (α,ŵ) ≤ ǫn. We denote L 0 [E, ǫn] the span of the states |ψ α,θ where d E (α, z) > ǫn. We denote
. A vector |φ in the state space of the photons has the ǫn-small distance property if and only if P 0 |φ = 0.
In other words, it must be in L 1 [E c , ǫn]. The operation M v has the ǫn-smalldistance property if and only if, for every (b, w, θ), M v P 0 |b, w, θ C |ψ w,θ = 0. The small-distance property corresponds to what Yao calls the low-weight property in [27] . Note that Yao defines the low weight property in terms of all the positions, not only those in E c . This difference is not so important: it is clear that L 1 [{1, . . . , n}, ǫn] is a subspace of L 1 [E c , ǫn] , so Yao's low-weight property implies the small distance property.
Using the small distance property
We now show that if the small distance property holds and c = 1, then v provides no information at all on b. This corresponds to a generalization of lemma 1 in Yao's paper [27] . The minimum distance of a code C is the minimum Hamming distance d(c, c ′ ) where c and c ′ are distinct codewords in C. Let C ⊥ 0 be the span of the (r + m) rows of the matrix f seen as vectors in GF (2) N . Let dN be the minimum distance of C ⊥ 0 . Because the matrix f is chosen at random, for any η > 0, except with negligible probability, we have Proof. The basic idea is to show that, for a fixed v such that c = 1, the prob-
Equation (1) 
. We obtain that P C operates as the identity operator on |b, w ′ , θ ′ C . Furthermore, one may easily check that (1) implies that we can express the ǫn-small distance property on M v via the following equation.
Because of these two facts, from hereafter we can ignore the classical part of the initial state in our computation. Now, equation (1) implies
The two last constraints can be written in one equation f w[E c ] = x where x is the concatenation of s and t.
The only degree of freedom is β
There is a one-to-one correspondence between the strings β ∈ C x and the pairs (w ′ , θ ′ ) ∈ P v,b . Let p(v|β) = p(v|b, w ′ , θ ′ ) and |ψ β,θ = |ψ w ′ ,θ ′ . Ignoring the classical part of the initial state and using (2) we obtain
Now, we would like to restrict our analysis to the photons with position in E c . One may insert the projection P = | ψ w,θ [E c ] ψ w,θ [E c ] | in front of the state |ψ β,θ because this projection is implicit in the definition of this state. One obtains p(v|β) = | φ v |P 1 P |ψ β,θ | 2 . These two projections commute, so we obtain
and |ψ β,θ = |ψ w,θ [Ē c ] |ψ β,θ where both |φ ′′ v and |ψ β,θ are states for the photons with position in E c . We obtain that p(v|β) = | φ
where |φ v = P 1 |φ ′′ v has the ǫn-small-distance property. Now, consider the density operators ρ x = 2 −k β∈Cx |ψ β,θ ψ β,θ | where k = N − r − m. We shall show that these density operators cannot be distinguished by any state |φ that has the ǫn-small distance property. In section 9, it is shown that, in the context E c = E 1 , for every β ∈ C x , the matrix representation of ρ x in Bob's basis {|ψ α,θ | α ∈ {0, 1} N } is given by
For every pair of distinct strings x, x ′ ∈ {0, 1} m+r , we have that a necessary condition for (∆ρ
and is different from 0. Therefore, a necessary condition for (∆ρ) α,α ′ = 0 is that
This concludes the proof. ⊓ ⊔
The density matrices
In this section, we consider only the photons with positions in E 1 = E c . Thereforeθ is the opposite of θ, that is, (∀i)θ i = θ i . We temporarily remove the tilde over the symbol ψ. It is as if we considered the general situation where N photons are sent from Alice to Bob in a string of bases θ ∈ {+, ×} N and we want to find the matrix representation of the density operators ρ x = 2 −k β∈Cx |ψ β,θ ψ β,θ | in the opposite basis {|ψ α,θ }. We need some basic tool. For every vector β ∈ GF(2) N , the mapping β ′ → β ′ ⊕ β on GF(2) n corresponds to a unitary transformation U β on the state space of the photons defined via U β |ψ β ′ ,θ = |ψ β⊕β ′ ,θ . One may easily check that, for every position i where β i = 1, the transformation U β maps |0 θ i into itself and |1 θ i into −|1 θ i . So, if there is an even number of positions i where α i = β i = 1, we have U β |ψ α,θ = |ψ α,θ , otherwise, we have U β |ψ α,θ = −|ψ α,θ . In terms of the operation ⊙ on the vector space GF (2) n , we have
For every β ∈ C x , we have C x = C 0 ⊕ β. Therefore, for every β ∈ C x ,
where we have used U † β = U β . For any operator ρ and any β, one may easily check that, in Bob's basis,
Therefore, in view of (3) and (4), we are done if we have the matrix representation of the density operator ρ 0 in Bob's basis. Let k = N −m−r and {β 1 , . . . , β k } be a basis of C 0 . For every j = 1, . . . , k, let C (j) be the span of {β 1 , . . . , β j } and ρ
We shall show by induction on j, that for j = 0, . . . , k,
The case j = 0 can be easily computed:
n . We assume that (5) holds for j and obtain it for j + 1. Because
Therefore, using formula 4, we obtain
Note that (ρ (j+1) ) α,α ′ is either 0 or 2 −N . We obtain that (
This concludes the induction. Using the density matrix of ρ 0 = ρ (k) , together with formula 3 and 4, we finally obtain that, for every
10 Proving the small distance property
Consider an example where Bob chooses a random bit OK and stores all the photons when and only when OK = 1. In this case, Bob passes the test with a probability a little bit greater than 1/2 and the small distance property holds with probability 1/2. The point is that we should not expect that, if Bob has a significant probability to pass the test, then the small distance property always holds. In this example, except with negligible probability, the small distance property holds when Bob passes the test. Consider another example where Bob commitsθ = + n , measures every photon in a fixed basis θ ′ and commits the outcomeŵ. The fixed basis θ ′ cannot be too far away from + because otherwise Bob will not pass the test. Without loss of generality, assume that the magnitude of + 0|0 θ ′ = + 1|1 θ ′ = c θ ′ is close to 1 and the magnitude of + 0|1 θ ′ = + 1|0 θ ′ = s θ ′ is close to 0. The valueŵ is included in v and |φ v = |ψŵ ,θ ′ . If we expand |φ v in Bob's basis + n we obtain |φ v = α ψ α,+ n |ψŵ ,θ ′ |ψ α,+ n . Note that | ψ α,+ n |ψŵ ,θ ′ | = |s θ ′ | d(α,ŵ) × |d θ ′ | n−d(α,ŵ) . So |λ α | = | ψ α,+ n |ψŵ ,θ ′ | is very small when d(α,ŵ) is large. In this second example, the small distance property does not hold, but it almost holds. Now, we briefly sketch a proof that, for every strategy used by Bob, except with negligible probability, if Bob passes the test, then the small distance property almost holds. A complete proof is found in [27] . Let γ = 10 −6 and Info be the binary random variable that takes the value 0 if and only if
The condition Info = 0 means that, for all practical purposes, we can use the small distance property, obtain (2), etc. in our proof of lemma 1. So, we want to obtain that if Pr(Pass = 1) > 2 −γn then Pr(Info = 1 | Pass = 1) ≤ 2 −γn .
The variable Info concerns the final view of Bob. It is easier to consider the situation just after the announcement of θ. Therefore, let us consider the ratio r(pass, θ, R,ŵ) = Tr(P 0 Π (pass,θ,R,ŵ) P 0 ρ) Tr(Π (pass,θ,R,ŵ) ρ)
where ρ is Alice's preparation and Π (pass,θ,R,ŵ) = M † (θ,pass,R,ŵ) M (θ,pass,R,ŵ) . We shall briefly sketch why Pr(Pass = 1) > 2 −2γn implies that r(pass , θ, R,ŵ) Pass =1 ≤ 2 −2γn (8) where r Pass =1 denotes the expected value of r in the context Pass = 1. This do the job because Pr(Pass = 1) > 2 −γn implies that Pr(Pass = 1) > 2 −2γn and expanding the expected value r(pass , θ, R,ŵ) Pass =1 and after some algebra, one obtains that (8) 
where P pass [T 0 ∩ R, δn] refers to section 7. The right hand side of (9) and (10) can also be obtained from the following definition of Pass, Θ, R andŴ . Alice chooses θ and R as usual, but prepares a perfectly random state |ψ α,θ usinĝ θ rather than θ. Bob measures in the basesθ to obtain α and then executes Mŵ to obtainŵ. Finally, Alice announces R and θ. Let J[E, τ n] = 0 if and
